By Lorenc Vangjeli
This is the political portrait of Edi Rama and of an unusual trajectory: from sport and art, to politics and steering the country. It is the story of a figure who, in the early days of pluralism, was perceived as a rebel, an anti-conformist and an opponent of the old system, only to end up decades later as the man who has concentrated a large part of political power in Albania around himself.
Rama first drew public attention through his polemical and journalistic style. He then entered politics almost by chance, but at a moment that coincided with an early personal ambition. Throughout his career he managed to maneuver between Fatos Nano, Ilir Meta, Pandeli Majko and Sali Berisha, building different political and personal relationships with each of them.
He then achieved what no Albanian prime minister of the pluralist period had accomplished before: four consecutive governing mandates. Today, however, he faces protesters demanding his departure.
Rama’s political history is intertwined with the traits of a controversial personality, with an extraordinary belief in himself and in his role in leading the country. His critics describe him as a leader inclined toward political narcissism, Machiavellianism and populism, while for years his supporters have seen in him the figure of a modernizing politician capable of imposing a vision.
In difficult days he knows how to appear modest and restrained; at moments of political strength, his critics have often accused him of arrogance and contempt toward opponents.
This is the story of a man who personalized the Socialist Party, transformed the way it functions and created a system in which political decision-making is increasingly tied to the figure of the leader. But it is also the story of a power that today faces the dissatisfaction that its own model has produced.
I – How did it all begin?
The first evidence of Edi Rama’s interest in power dates to the late 1980s. Former university colleagues recall jokes from that time, when Rama said that one day he could become President of the Republic.
It would take him about ten years to actually enter the corridors of power.
In a political class that had emerged rapidly from the end of communism, Rama was completely atypical. In his dress, manner of speaking and public conduct, he stood out clearly from the early politicians of the transition.
His first serious opportunity came when he entered government as Minister of Culture. Although the post was not among the most politically powerful, Rama managed to turn it into the first stage where he built his public profile.
Then came the Tirana Municipality, control over the Socialist Party and, finally, governing.
In December 1990, Rama had been close to the student movement and had tried to play a bigger role in it. But another figure with extraordinary political ambition was rising in that space: Sali Berisha.
The political rivalry between them, which would later mark a good part of the Albanian transition, was born there.
There are even recordings from the early 1990s in which Rama can be heard speaking clearly about the need to bring down the communist system politically and for new forces to take power. Compared with the more emotional rhetoric of other protagonists of the time, Rama appeared more concrete in the way he viewed the political battle.
II – The invitation to enter politics
The decisive invitation came from Fatos Nano.
Nano included Rama in the socialist government, perhaps thinking he was bringing into the cabinet an energetic public figure capable of confronting Berisha in the media and political arena.
Rama’s greatest political gift, however, would come from Ilir Meta.
It was Meta who backed his candidacy for the Tirana Municipality, placing the electoral structure of the Socialist Party at his disposal.
The victory in Tirana transformed Rama.
For the first time he had a large executive power and a daily public platform in his hands.
He used this position to maneuver between the two main poles of the socialists, Nano and Meta, but also to build around himself an ever-larger group of supporters.
Rama understood the importance of the media very early. He built strong relationships with television owners, publishers and journalists. For a part of the media of the 1990s and early 2000s, he represented a figure different from traditional politicians.
Rama himself came from journalism and polemics.
His style was aggressive, ironic and often provocative, but precisely for this reason it attracted attention.
Many of the journalists who once saw him as a figure close to their own world would, years later, become among his harshest critics.
At that time, Rama also began to be perceived as the only figure on the left who could realistically rival Sali Berisha.
Berisha, even after losing power in 1997, continued to emotionally dominate the Albanian political scene. For the socialists he was at once their greatest opponent and the factor that kept them united.
In this climate, Rama gradually built an economic and political center around the Tirana Municipality, especially through urban development and the construction industry.
His critics have for years raised accusations of close ties with powerful economic interests and individuals with problematic pasts, accusations that have been part of the public debate throughout his career.
Another issue that has been discussed is the relationship between Rama and a part of the generation of politicians close to him with the Soros Foundation. Many figures who later entered the administration or politics had previously worked in civil society organizations linked to this foundation.
III – Power over the party
After years of maneuvering between Meta and Nano, Rama challenged Fatos Nano at the Socialist Party Congress of 2003.
He lost the battle. But the defeat was not final.
It clearly placed his name for the first time in the position of the next alternative for leading the left.
At that stage, Rama had an interest in the Socialist Party falling into an internal crisis and in the existing leadership being weakened.
The 2005 elections created exactly this terrain.
Fatos Nano stepped aside, and Rama emerged as practically the only candidate with enough weight to take over the leadership of the party.
To socialists shaken by Berisha’s return to power, Rama promised a quick comeback.
He had understood that the road to the Prime Minister’s Office first ran through full control of the party.
For four years, until the 2009 elections, he had to coexist with a parliamentary group built mainly by Fatos Nano and the old socialist structures. Then came 2008.
The Rama-Berisha agreement on constitutional changes transformed Albania’s political system.
The changes strengthened the power of party leaders over candidate lists and, consequently, over parliamentary groups.
In practice, the two main leaders gained far greater control over their parties.
Albania was entering a political model in which, increasingly, everything passed through the leader.
Rama lost the 2009 elections, but he gained something else: a parliamentary group structured mainly around people elected under his leadership.
Ilir Meta’s move into a coalition with Sali Berisha made it even easier for Rama to consolidate his position within the PS.
The party had lost the elections, but Rama had won control over it.
IV – All the power
In 2013 Rama returned to an alliance with Ilir Meta.
The PS-LSI coalition brought him to power, but power-sharing was not the final destination.
Rama’s political aim was a majority that no longer needed a decisive ally.
This happened in 2017.
The weaknesses of the opposition, its internal conflicts, the political mistakes of Lulzim Basha and the complicated relations with Ilir Meta helped Rama win the majority on his own.
In Rama’s own terminology, he took “the pan and the helm.” After the 2017 elections, his political model changed considerably.
The opposition was weakened further by its own wrong decisions, especially the burning of parliamentary mandates and the boycott of the local elections.
In the absence of a strong political counterweight, Rama managed to consolidate control over the Socialist Party and over the institutions led by the majority.
From that moment on, the political careers of many people within the PS increasingly depended on the personal decision of the party chairman.
Ministers, deputies, local leaders and administration officials saw Rama as the main source of their promotion or removal.
At the same time, according to critics, loyalty to the leader began to weigh increasingly heavily against merit or political autonomy.
In 2018-2019, after the student protests, Rama removed from the government some of the figures with a traditional political profile and replaced them with names who were more technocratic and less politically powerful. This process further weakened the weight of the traditional structures of the Socialist Party.
Gradually, “Rilindja” was transformed from a platform within the PS into the main identity of power.
One of the paradoxes of this system is that many of those who were promoted directly by Rama may today have a political interest in distancing themselves from him, at the moment they perceive the weakening of power.
People who once saw closeness to the leader as the fastest way to rise may now see the same closeness as a burden in a moment of crisis.
In parallel, during Rama’s long time in government, the weight of a limited group of large companies in the Albanian economy also grew considerably.
This constantly fueled debate over economic concentration, concessions, public-private partnerships and the relationship between political power and business.
Critics of the government have described this as a model in which political power and economic interests have become increasingly interdependent.
Over the years, the personalization of power, the centralization of decision-making and communication increasingly controlled by the prime minister himself created a political model built around a single figure.
Rama increasingly used public monologue, direct communication and social networks, often bypassing the traditional forms of political debate. This is precisely where the paradox of his power lies.
The more power accumulates around one person, the less ability he has to share responsibility when the system enters a crisis.
In this sense, Rama’s extraordinary political strength may also be his greatest weakness.
When almost every success is attributed to the leader, every failure also ends up at his address.
Even the declaration of Sali Berisha as “non grata,” which at one point seemed set to finally weaken the opposition, did not free Rama from political pressure.
On the contrary, after more than a decade in power, the wear and tear of governing has become a factor in itself.
Relying heavily on polls, digital communication, technology and, most recently, artificial intelligence, Rama increasingly risks seeing reality through the filters of the people and systems that surround him.
But real Albania may be far more complicated than the Albania that appears on television screens, in polls or in international salons.
And precisely here lies the dilemma of the final phase of his power: the leader who for years built a system around himself must now face the consequences of that system almost alone.